Overheating economy reaching its peak
As a result of surging military-related production, Russia recorded solid growth in 2023. Military-oriented manufacturing industries grew by double-digit rates. The rebound was also driven by household consumption. The latter has benefitted from the growth of real wages triggered by labour shortages, with unemployment reaching an all-time low (2.6% in April 2024). Those shortages result from declining demographics, partial military mobilisation and emigration, as well as manufacturing mobilised by sharply increased military procurements. Furthermore, increased payments and transfers to soldiers and their families led to higher consumer spending. Last, defense companies often win the competition for skilled workers over civilian enterprises. Both public and private investments increased as demand for Russian products grew and the development of new transport and logistics infrastructure directed towards the East became necessary.
At the beginning of 2024, the Russian economy still exhibited signs of solid economic activity. However, the latter is expected to cool in the remaining part of this year and 2025. Already, at the end of the first quarter, output was dropping in construction and services, as well as in mining and quarrying. Growth was slowing in manufacturing, although still strong in war-related industries. On that score, Russia’s focus on the war is confirmed by data. Over the past two years, output in military-related industries has surged significantly, whereas it has largely stayed the same in other manufacturing industries. In Q1 2024, the average output of war-related industries rose by more than 50% compared to the same period in 2021 and 2022 before Russia's invasion, while output in other manufacturing industries increased by only 0.5%.
The overheating economy, lower export revenues, increasing imports and capital outflows have resulted in the depreciation of the ruble and in growing inflation. The Russian central bank (CBR) managed to contain ruble depreciation, resulting in currency stabilisation in late 2023. However, inflation has been increasing since April 2023 and reached 8.0% year-over-year in May 2024. The CBR has hiked interest rates several times since mid-2023 by a total of 850 basis points to 16%. Tight financial conditions and capacity restrictions will drag on growth in 2024 and a slower pace of household consumption should be expected. Tight monetary conditions will weaken investment growth from 2025, although the key rate could average out at 10-12% in 2025 – still above the pre-invasion level – according to the latest CBR forecast at end-April 2024.
National Wealth Fund helps financing military spending
Increased spending mostly related to the war widened the budget deficit in 2023. Defence and national security take around 40% of the federal budget. Financing these two is hardly a problem for Russia. Last year, 90% of the deficit was covered by the sovereign National Wealth Fund (NWF). The NWF decreased by 10% in USD terms while its liquid part, which consists of foreign exchange and gold, declined by 36%. At the beginning of 2024, the NWF’s assets still amounted to the equivalent of USD 133 billion (8% of GDP), including its liquid part of USD 56 billion (3.3% of GDP). The latter is held in Chinese renminbi (60%) and gold (40%) as “Western” currencies were sold off in previous years. In terms of the federal budget, increased tax receipts reflected rising household consumption and companies' profitability amid strong economic activity. The deficit is expected to decrease in 2024 as the government enhances revenues through the planned introduction of progressive income taxation, with tax rates ranging from 13% to 20% as opposed to 13-15% currently, as well as a hike in the corporate tax rate from 20% to 25%. Furthermore, privatisation and measures such as implementing a price floor mechanism for calculating oil taxes to mitigate the impact of rising discounts on Russian oil compared to Brent will support revenues. Under the fiscal rule, excess oil and gas revenues have been set aside and converted into foreign currencies in the National Wealth Fund (NWF). The rule was suspended after the invasion in 2022 and reinstated in 2024 to restrict the government’s ability to finance the deficit from the NWF, as was the case in 2022 and 2023.
Western sanctions have especially hurt the energy sector. Oil and gas revenues contracted by 24% and accounted for 28% of total federal budget revenues in 2023 compared to 35% in 2022. However, oil production fell by only 1.2% to 11 million barrels per day as the sanctions’ impact has been partly offset over time by strong domestic consumption and the reorientation of trade flows to China and other countries that have not taken up sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, the “shadow fleet” has enabled Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, particularly the price cap mechanism, through vessels whose ownership structure is opaque and hard to identify. The share of oil and gas sector in GDP decreased moderately from above 17%, before the war, to 16%. However, the comparison is affected by the depreciation of Russian currency which lost 30% in the course of 2023. Nevertheless, the volume of exported petroleum products decreased in the first quarter of 2024 due to reduced refining capacity caused by Ukrainian drone strikes and a government ban on gasoline exports started in early March. However, this decline in petroleum product exports has been compensated by an increase in crude oil exports.
Russia’s current account is keeping to a surplus thanks to lower imports and reduced transfers from private persons to accounts abroad, and lower dividends repatriated by foreign investors. In both 2024 and 2025, exports will be less robust than imports as sales to Asia will not compensate losses recorded in the Western markets. At the same time, natural gas which remains one of Russia’s flagship export products is suffering from inadequate pipeline and LNG infrastructure to redirect exports. Conversely, solid growth of imports is expected thanks to weaker but still increasing household consumption.
The presidential pseudo-election awards another term to Putin
In the latest presidential elections of March 2024, Vladimir Putin secured another term of office after receiving 87.3% of the vote at a record 77.5% turnout. The result means Putin will be President until at least 2030, when he will turn 77. The law was changed in 2008 to extend presidential terms to six years and later constitutional changes removed limits on presidential terms, which potentially enables Putin to remain in power until 2036. The voting system in the latest presidential elections allowed for greater manipulation, including voting online, voting off-site or at home. State-owned media were also previously used to spread propaganda and disinformation. To eliminate any political alternative for voters, critics were repressed: of Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested and Alexei Navalny was poisoned, later arrested and then died in unexplained circumstances in a Siberian penal colony. Following his inauguration for another presidential term, Putin decided on the new composition of the Russian cabinet, with Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin retaining his position. Among the 21 ministers, six were new appointees, while the most important change was appointing Andrei Belousov as the defence minister. The appointment of Belousov, who previously served as first deputy prime minister responsible for Russia’s socio-economic development, indicates that Putin’s ongoing focus is to maintain the economy on a war footing.
The objectives announced for Putin’s new term include those communicated previously, such as nationalist policies, increasing the birth rate and investing more in research and development. However, recently, a wider focus was placed on Russia’s economic self-sufficiency by targeting a reduction in the volume of imports to 17% of GDP, along with Russia achieving technological independence in various fields such as artificial intelligence, space technology, and energy technology.